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ABSTRACT
The potential costs of several options of a manned Mars mission are
examined. A cost estimating methodology based primarily on existing
Marshall Space Flight Center (NSFC) parametric cost models is
summarized. These models include the NSFC Space Station Cost Model and
the NSFC Launch Vehicle Cost Model as well as other models and
techniques. The groundrules and assumptions of the cost estimating
methodology are discussed and cost estimates presented for six
potential mission options which have been studied. The estimated manned
Mars mission costs are compared to the cost of the somewhat analogous
Apollo Program cost after normalizing the Apollo cost to the
environment and groundrules of the manned Mars missions. It is con-
cluded that a manned Mars mission, as currently defined, could be accom-
plished for under $30 billion In 1985 dollars excluding launch
vehicle development and mission operations.
COST ESTIMATING METHODOLOGY
The costs for the manned Mars missions were primarily estimated
using adaptations of existing parametric cost models which relate the
cost of historical NASA programs to certain technical characteristics of
those programs (e.g. weight, power, etc.). Figure 1 is a typical
example of such a relationship. The majority of the hardware items
required for the mission were estimated at the subsystem level using
such cost estimating relationships (CER's). Specifically, the models
utilized and their application were:
(1) COST HODEL: MSFC Launch Vehicle Cost Hodel
WHERE APPLIED: LEO Departure Stage and Engines
Mars Arrival and Departure Stage and Engines
Descent Stage and Engines
Ascent Stage and Engines
Earth Braking Stage
KSC Launch Facilities
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FIGURE I
(2) COST MODEL: MSFC Space Station Cost Model
WHERE APPLIED: Mission Modules
Mars Excursion Module
(3) COST MODEL: GSFC Spacecraft Instruments Cost Model
WHERE APPLIED: Venus and Mars Noon Probes
Mission Module Experiments
Mars Surface Experiments
Certain elements of costs which were not estimated parametrically
included STS and SDV-3R Launch Vehicle operations costs (i.e. costs per
flight) which were taken from other currently ongoing MSFC studies.
Also, insufficient definition existed to parametrically estimate
Mission Control and Training Facilities and these were estimated strictly
by engineering judgement. Some costs were not estimated, because of the
lack of definition; these included low Earth orbit (LEO) assembly/logls-
tics facilities, Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) operations costs,
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) operations costs, Space Station
operating costs, Space Station facility cost impacts and Mission
Operations costs.
OTHER GROUNDRULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
All costs presented are in constant 1985 dollars and include the
prime contractor cost with fee.
A 14_ allowance has been included for Program Support costs (which
is generally consistent with other large NASA programs including Apollo
and Shuttle and is also consistent with the allowance being carried in
the current estimates of the Space Station Program). Program Support
includes such activities as crew training and simulation, mission
planning, computer support, software and data reduction, ground trans-
portation, parallel development programs, propellants and consumables,
tests using existing facilities (e.g. wind tunnel tests, KC 135 Zero G
tests, etc.) and other costs which cannot be explicitly Identified in a
conceptual definition.
A 5_ allowance has been included at the program level (i.e. 5_ of
total program cost) as an allowance for a major prime contractor
integration contract. This is, again, generally representative of the
experience of other major space programs.
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The Nars spacecraft Mission Nodule assumes some inheritance from
Space Station habitation modules and associated subsystems. This was
reflected in the cost estimates of the appropriate Mission Nodule
subsystems (e.g. pressurized structure, solar arrays, fuel ceils, envi-
ronmental control and life support, crew accommodations, and other
selected subsystems) through the use of complexity factors in the range
of 0.7 to 0.9. (Meaning that the items costed would be expected to cost
from 70_ to 90_ of historical trends).
Some discussion has been given to utilizlng inherited hardware for
two stages of the Mars mlsslon spacecraft. The Low Earth Orbit Departure
Stage might be a derivative of External Tank (ET) hardware or possibly
SDV-3R hardware (which itself might utilize ET hardware). The Mars
Departure Stage in some configurations studied could be an Orbital
Transfer Vehicle which will likely be in the NASA inventory of vehicles
by the late 1990's. Because these hardware inheritance concepts are
prelimina;y ideas and because they are dependent upon the configuration
of the Nars mission stages, no cost savings have been assumed at the
present time. The potentlal exists, however, for some reductions in
stage cost as these options are further explored.
The Mars mission Earth-to-LEO transportation costs assumes use of
the Shuttle at $100 million per flight and the SDV-3R at $80 million per
flight. Because OTV and OMV traffic requirements have not been
identified, no costs are included for these systems. It is expected
that any such costs, when identified, will be relatively minor.
A 15_ weight contingency has been included in all weights which
were used as CER independent variables. In addition, a 35_ cost
contingency has been included at the module/stage level in the cost
estimate. These contingencies are meant to reflect uncertainties in the
weight estimating, cost estimating, and program definition processes and
are considered adequate for the level of definition of the project.
In general, the cost estimates reflect the prototype approach,
with one system test hardware article and one flight article. An excep-
tion to this is the Mars Excursion Module ascent and descent engine
development program which assumed 15 test articles (consistent with
historical engine development programs).
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The manned Mars mission cost estimate assumes the existence,
availability and use of the SDV-3R launch vehicle, Space Station, Orbital
Transfer Vehicle, Orbital Manuervering Vehicle, STME Engine, RLIO0
Engine, TDRS and a deep space communications capability. This
groundrule is based upon the assumption that each of the above systems
will be developed prior to the time-frame of the manned Mars mission for
use in other programs. This premise is perhaps most debatable in the
case of the SDV-3R launch vehicle. However, if the Mars mission is the
first user of the SDV-3R, there are undoubtedly other space programs
which would greatly benefit from the existence of a heavy lift capa-
bility. Due to these uncertainties, the development cost of the SDV-3R
is carried in the manned Mars mission as a "below the line" cost and is
not charged to the Mars mission in this analysis.
COST ESTIMATES
Major cost estimating emphasis was placed upon estimating the
costs of six potential manned Mars mission options. These cases were:
(A) 1999 Opposition, LOX/LH 2 Propulsive-Braked; (B) 1999 Conjunction,
LOX/LH 2 Propulsive-Braked; (C) 1999 Opposition, Aerobraked; (D) 1999
Conjunction, Aerobraked; (E) 2001 Opposition LOX/Lfl 2 Propulsive Braked;
and (F) 2001 Opposition, Aerobraked.
While numerous other missions are possible, it is felt that these
six represent a viable sampling of cases which should be representative
of the costs to be expected for a manned Mars mission. Table 1 and
Figure 2 present summary cost data for these configurations. These
costs, which exclude the development cost of the SDV-3R launch vehicle,
range from a total of about $23 to $24 billion for the aerobraked cases,
to about $26 to $27 billion for the propulsive-braked options. Due to the
flight mechanics of the 1999 mission opportunities, the propulsive
energy required for the conjunction class missions is less than the
energy required for the opposition class missions (see "Mission Concepts
and Opportunities" by Young). This is reflected in the cost shown in
Table 1 in the Stages and Transportation cost line items which are the
costs of the stage hardware and the Shuttle/SDV-3R transportation
operations, respectively. The Spacecraft and Science costs however, are
higher for the conjunction class missions, reflecting the impact of the
longer stay times of these missions.
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TABLE 1
MANNED MARS MISSION COST SUMMARY
(ALL COSTS FY85 $ IN MILLIONS)
Case A
1999 Opposition
Propulsive Braked
Case B
1999 Opposition
Propulsive Braked
Case C
1999 Opposition
Aerobraked
Spacecraft
Stages
Science
Transport
Facilities
Integration
$11,201
$8,095
$1,439
$2,500
$2,330
$1,278
$12,009
$7,028
$1,818
$1,460
$2,330
$1,232
$11,201
$6,389
$1,439
$1,300
$2,330
$1,133
TOTAL $26,843 $25,877 $23,792
Case D
1999 Conjunction
Aerobraked
Case E
2001 Opposition
Propulsive Braked
Case F
2001 Opposition
Aerobraked
Spacecraft
Stages
Science
Transport
Facilities
Integration
$12,009
$5,387
$1,818
$1,220
$2,330
$1,138
$11,201
$7,327
$1,439
$1,860
$2,330
$1,208
$11,201
$5,629
$1,439
$1,460
$2,330
$1,103
TOTAL $23,902 $26,365 $23,162
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From the cost and technical standpoint, Case F appears to be the
most attractive option of the six cases investigated. For slmpllclty,
the remainder of this paper will refer to Case F, the 2001 Opposition
Mission with aerobraking.
Table 2 and the corresponding pie chart of Figure 3 detail the
$23.1 billion dollar cost estimate for this mission. Nearly 50_ of the
total cost is attrlbutable to the Spacecraft. As can be seen from Table
2, this cost further subdivides into the Habitation Nodule, the
Laboratory/Loglstics Nodules and the Mars Excursion Nodule (MEN). Nearly
one fourth of the total cost is for interplanetary stages which include
the LEO Departure Stage, the Mars Arrival and Departure Stage, the MEN
Ascent and Descent Stages and the Earth Braking Stage. The remaining
fourth of total program costs is accounted for by the Experiments and
Probes (6_), Transportation Operations (6_), ground based facilities
(10_), and an allowance of about 5_ for project level integration. The
SDV-3R development cost is cited on Table 2 as a "below the line" cost.
As can be seen from Table 2, a little over three fourths of total
cost would be expended in the development phase of the project and the
remaining cost in the production phase. Development includes all system
hardware DDT&E, and system test articles and facilities; production
includes flight article procurement and transportation operations.
Figure 4 displays the anticipated annual funding requirements of the
manned Mars mission. The distribution of funding assumes a nine-year
development and production span and a distribution of funds corresponding
to a Beta distribution with 60_ of costs incurred in 50_ of the time for
development costs and uniform funding for production costs (a typical
distribution for NASA projects). Peak year funding would occur in year
three, with a requirement of about $5.6 billion. The inflection point
in year seven is due to the buildup of flight hardware production
1
activities.
lit should be noted that this prediction process estimates actual costs
as they would appear looking back in time from the end of the program.
If the values are to be used for budgeting, reserves for program growth
should be identified at the peak years and beyond, to reflect actual
historical program trends.
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TABLE 2
MANNED MARS MISSION PRELIMINARY COST ESTIMATE
(FY85 DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
2001 OPPOSITION
ALL AEROBRAKE
CASE F
Mission Hodule-Habltatlon Module
Mission Module-Lab/Log Module
Mars Excusion Module
Spacecraft Subtotal
LEO Departure Stage
Mars Arrival & Departure Stage
HEM Ascent & Descent Stages
Earth Braking Stages
Stages Subtotal
Experiments & Probes
SDV Transportation
STS Transportation
Transportation Subtotal
Launch Facilities
Mission Control
Training Facilities
Facilities Subtotal
Space Station Impacts
Program Level Integration
Total
Launch Vehicle Development
DDT&E
$3,774
$1,704
$3,778
$9,256
$2,533 $
$1,131 $
$1,212 $
$ 0 $
$4,876 $
$ 763 $
$
PRODUC-
TION
$1,135
$ 283
$ 527
$1,945
TOTAL
$ 4,909
$ 1,987
$ 4,305
$11.201
$2,130
$ 100
$ 100
$2,33O
TBD
$ 861
426 $ 2,959
225 $ 1,356
102 $ 1,314
0 $ 0
753 $ 5,629
676 $ 1,439
960 $ 960
$18,086
$ 3,000
$ 500 $ 500
$1,460 $ 1,460
$ 2,130
$ 100
$ lO0
$ 2,330
TBD TBD
$ 242 $ 1,103
$5,076 $23,162
$1,000 $ 4.000
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COMPARISON OF MANNED MARS MISSION AND APOLLO COST
The historical space project most comparable to the manned Mars
mission is the Apollo Program. In fact, there is a tendency to assume
that the cost of a mission to Mars will cost as much as the Apollo
Program (in the same year dollars). There are a number of reasons why
this need not be true. The comparison of the cost of Apollo to the cost
of a manned Mars mission requires cognizance of several fundamental
differences in the cost drivers of these two programs.
First, the Apollo Program was mission and schedule constrained.
The goal was to put man on the Moon by the end of the (1960's) decade.
Thus cost, the third variable in any program, became the unconstrained
variable. Cost was allowed to grow in order to meet the mission and
schedule goals which were deemed to be unchangeable. Presumably, the
Mars mission will be accomplished in an environment that allows flexibi-
lity in all three program variables such that something near the optimum
mission, schedule, and cost can be achieved.
Secondly, at the beginning of the Apollo Program, the space infra-
structure was still in its infancy. The Mars mission, on the other
hand, will benefit from a space program with a forty year experience
base.
Thirdly, because space was such a new and largely unknown environ-
ment in which to operate (and also probably because the funding was
available), the Apollo Program had extremely intensive redundancy and
test philosophies. The typical flight system was preceeded by dozens of
test articles. From this beginning, the space program has matured to
the point where the typical manned system today (e.g. Shuttle or Space
Station) has, at most, one test article.
Finally, the cost of the Apollo Program which is widely quoted
(about $20 billion in "then-year" dollars or about $80 billion in 1985
dollars) purchased the entire series of Saturn Vehicles and Apollo Moon
landing missions. The manned Mars mission cost presented in this paper
is for the initial mission only.
Therefore, before comparisons are valid, the $80 billion price tag
for Apollo must be analytically normalized to a basis consistent wlth
the environment of the Mars mission as estimated in this paper.
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Figure 5 shows such a normalization. The $20 billion ($80 billion
in 1985 dollars) cost of Apollo is shown broken into its major
components.
The first normalization excludes the Saturn I and Saturn IB launch
vehicles which were precursors to the Saturn V development program and
have no analogous requirements in the manned Mars mission. This reduces
the $80 billion Apollo cost to around $73 billion.
The second adjustment reduces the large number of test articles
in each of the Apollo Program llne items to the equivalent of one proto-
type test article and one flight article for the non-englne program line
items and to the equivalent of 15 test articles for the engine develop-
ment line item. This adjustment to today's test phllosophy reduces the
cost down to around $61 billion.
In order to be consistent with manned Mars mission cost, the final
adjustment deletes the cost of all Apollo missions beyond the first
mission. This reduces the Apollo cost to about $37 billion.
This cost still includes some artifacts of the Apollo era way of
doing business which were difficult to quantlfy. These include
parallel development programs and heavy Supporting Research and
Technology activities. Also note that about $16 billion ($14 billion
plus a pro rata share of mission support) is relatable to the launch
vehicle. Therefore, the basic Apollo cost which is comparable to the
manned Mars mission cost estimate is around $21 billion, which is
actually slightly lower than the range of costs estimated In this paper.
Considering the increased challenges due to the greater interplanetary
distances involved in the Mars mission, cost in the mid-to-upper twenty
billion dollar range for the Mars mission seems appropriate.
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CONCLUSIONS
The preliminary engineering cost analysis of the manned Mars mission
indicates that the cost, excluding launch vehicle development and mission
operations, should be less than $30 billion in 1985 dollars for the
initial mission. This cost estlmate independently compares well with the
cost of the somewhat analogous Apollo Program when the cost of that pro-
gram is normalized to the environment and groundrules of the estimate
for the manned Mars mlssion. 2
2A separate paper (by K. Cyr) describes the budgetary requirements and
timing which might reasonably be anticipated for the program,
illustrating that missions in this time period are feasible within
reasonable budget levels.
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